# \*\*\*\*\* SECOND CHAPTER NOTES\*\*\*\*\*

### Fearon 1998 has a theoretical account of noncompliance

These functions can contribute directly to higher levels of and to expanding state preferences to be more inclusive and long-term; this increases the scope of cooperation immensely (Kydd, 2000; Russett & Oneal, 2001).

**gent2010**

* **did settlement attempt end claim**
  + Binding Third party attempt - positive – nonbinding has no effect
  + Salience doesn’t matter
  + MIDS in last five years – increases
  + Joint democracy
* **settlement attempt leads to claim termination**
  + Binding third party attempts – positive
  + Nonbinding third part - positive – smaller substantive effect than above
  + Salience – negative
* **Third party characteristics lead settlement to end claim**
  + Binding third party – positive
  + Power asymmetry - positive
  + No effect - Bias, democaracy, major power, ngo/igo, salience, joint democracy, s-score don’t matter
* **Third party characteristics lead to agreement and claim termination**
  + Same as above

**Mattes 2008**

* renegotiation of existing agreements
  + Uncertainty-reducing provisions in original agreements – positive – mattes2016 too
  + Go back and look at militarized disputes – presumablyt this means agreement failed
* Mid after agreement

**Mattes 2016**

* renegotiation of existing agreements
  1. Uncertainty reducing provisions – positive
  2. Go back and look at militarized disputes – presumably this means agreement failed
* Mid after agreement
  1. Cost-increasing provisions – negative
  2. Value of territory – increase
  3. Civil war – increase
  4. Change toward autocracy – positive
  5. Cost increasing provisions – negative

**Mitchell and Hensel 2007 – agreement compliance**

* Other third party - negative
* Binding settlement attempt - positive
* Shared institutions - positive
* Issue salience – negative

Description of DV: After an agreement is signed, each signatory may choose to carry out its terms, or may refuse to comply. For example, the terms of an agreement over a territorial claim generally involve a specific disposition of part or all of the claimed territory, which may mean that one side is recognized as sovereign over the entire territory (and the other side is abandoning its claims) or that the two sides reach a compromise over the division of the territory between them. Compliance thus means that both sides carry out the terms of the agreement, such as transferring the territory or dropping one’s claim; the failure by one or both to do this means that the agreement has not been complied with.

Even when border settlements lead to benefits for domestic audiences, these benefits may not be realized immediately.

But do these settlements last? Raymond (1996) provides evidence that the duration of democratic settlements differs little from settlements made by other leaders. Operationalizing durability as the absence of a militarized dispute in a five-year window after an arbitration decision, jointly democratic dyads and mixed/non-democratic dyads do not differ in their arbitration outcomes, even when controls for socio-cultural homogeneity and power distribution are introduced. The difference in research design is important here. Raymond (1996) controls for the salience of the dispute when analyzing the arbitration outcome, defining salience, at least in part, based on the presence of a territorial issue in the dispute.3 This suggests an important connection between territorial issues and the relationship between democracy and peace. Gibler, Douglas M.. The Territorial Peace (p. 138). Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition.

1. Domestic Politics and Territorial Disputes
   1. Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy
   2. Domestic Politics and Territorial Disputes
      1. Support hard-line policies
      2. Not support accommodationist policies
   3. Domestic Politics and Claim Management
      1. Salience
      2. CM
   4. Concessions are unpopular
   5. Settlements are unpopular
2. Economic Interdependence, Domestic Politics, and Militarized Disputes International Conflict
   1. Economic Interdependence and Conflict
   2. Domestic Politics
   3. What’s Missing?
3. Theory: Economic Interdependence and Settlement of Territorial Claims
   1. Claims create opportunity costs by creating unrealized gains from trade
      1. Shadow of War
      2. A2: Islands of Agreement
   2. W has an incentive to support settlement
      1. A2: Firms don’t reduce settlement
      2. A2: Military Industrial Complex
   3. Settlements Solve
   4. W supports trade
      1. Note: Outlined above, may need to expand here
4. Hypotheses

Territorial Disputes and Leader Survival

* Outbidding
* Legitimation

% citation - audience costs? putnam1988?

Moreover, if the winning coalition chooses to replace a leader who agrees to an unpopular settlement, their replacements are unlikely to comply. As such, all else equal, states are less likely to adhere to negotiated settlements as the salience of the claim (both in terms of territorial attributes and previous interactions between the disputants) increases \citep[e.g.,][]{mitchell2007a, simmons2002, vasquez2009}, although the involvement of outside actors may help create stronger incentives for states to adhere to these agreements \citep{fearon1995, walter2002}.

As the value of a claim increases, domestic audiences are willing to pay higher costs in order to obtain the territory.

1. Outbidding
   1. These dynamics may be further enhanced by a process of outbidding by which leaders must attempt to elicit public support by playing up the dangers posed by enemy states.
   2. Leaders or their challengers may capitalize on the threat posed by an enemy state to elicit support from domestic audiences by pursuing policies that ameliorate this threat.
   3. In order to do this, individuals may intentionally construct images of the enemy as hostile entities which cannot be appeased. Due to information asymmetry, leaders can often convince domestic audiences that their opponent poses a greater threat than they do.

Lock-in

This process of outbidding

Makes compromise difficult

\subsection{Substantive Article 2: Economic Interdependence, Leader Tenure, and Compliance with Territorial Agreements}

% Mechanism 1 - no ratification/implementation

First, even after leaders have signed agreements, domestic opposition to an agreed-upon settlement may prevent them from complying fully with the terms of an agreement. Although policymakers may genuinely intend to follow through on their commitments, they may be unable to do so if they do not have strong support among the winning coalition. \citep{putnam1988}. Doing so may lead the winning coalition to remove the leader from power in order to renege on the agreement.

Moreover, if an agreement is unpopular with influential elites or voters, this may provide opposition leaders with the chance to mobilize additional opposition and engineer a change in the winning coalition. If this occurs, the new winning coalition would be able to abrogate an agreement.

\begin{hypothesis} As the level of economic interdependence between two states increases, the probability that states comply with previously signed territorial agreements increases.\end{hypothesis}

# Domestic Politics and Cooperation

Schear, James A. 1989. Veri cation, Compliance, and Arms Control: The Dynamics of Domestic Debate.

In Nuclear Arguments, edited by Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller, 264–321. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell

University Press

Keohane, Robert, and Helen Milner, eds. 1996. Internationalization and Domestic Politics. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press

# Trade and Cooperation

## Generic

**Sayrs, Lois W. 1990. “Expected Utility and Peace Science: An Assessment of Trade  
and Con›ict.” *Con›ict Management and Peace Science* 12:17–44.**

Argues that rade Doesn’t influence coop

Although scholars have suggested that bilateral economic activity facilitates cooperation, few studies have attempted to evaluate this empirically. Few studies have examined whether economically interdependent states are more likely to engage in peaceful interactions. Although \citet{polachek1999} use the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) dataset to modle whether conflict occurs more frequently than cooperation. In addition, \citet{barbieri2002} finds that interdependent states are more likely to resolve militarized disputes via negotiations (as opposed to settlements imposed by the victor or a stalemate).

These studies do not examine whether states are more likely to attempt or achieve the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes.

**Domke, William Kinkade. 1988. *War and the Changing Global System.* New Haven:  
Yale University Press.**

**Polachek 1980**

**Polachek, Solomon, and Judy McDonald. 1992. “Strategic Trade and the Incentive for Cooperation.” In *Disarmament, Economic Conversion, and Peace Management,*ed. Manas Chatterji and Linda Rennie Forcey. New York: Praeger.**

**Polachek, Solomon, Yuan-Ching Chang, and John Robst. 1997.”Liberalism and  
Interdependence.” Department of Economics, State University of New York at  
Binghamton**

Conflict can hinder cooperation over navigational issues, as in the case of

* Hinder cooperation generally
* Barrett2003 – reduce quantity, quality, limit navigation

Cooperation over developing resources

Cooperation over managing water quality/quantity

States have several incentives to cooperate over

Development

Along these lines, while Verghese & Iyer (1993) blame precisely the absence of mutual economic stakes for the lack of cooperation in the eastern Himalayan river basins. verghese1993

# Institutions and Compliance

\begin{comment} % Additional cite: institutions lead to compliance:

Mansifeild and pollins 2003 heightened trade facilitates environmental treaty formation and acts as a contract enforcing mechanism (Neumayer 2002b; Stein 2003).New Perspectives on Economic Exchange and Armed Conflict.

Monitoring institutions can also improve compliance with river treaties. Formal mechanisms for monitoring the river can provide early warning of violations, which will prompt quicker enforcement actions (Benvenisti 1996). Even in cases where monitoring institutions do not track the actions of individual states, the information they provide can raise the visibility of environmental problems and draw the attention of domestic actors to the consequences of non-compliance (Dai 2005). This information will provide leverage to domestic interest groups favoring cooperation when they pressure their governments to resume compliance. Public pressure is especially important for implementing environmental agreements (Haas, Keohane, and Levy 1993).

% Additoinal cites - Institutions work: Even in cases where monitoring institutions do not track the actions of individual states, the information they provide can raise the visibility of environmental problems and draw the attention of domestic actors to the consequences of non-compliance (Dai 2005). This information will provide leverage to domestic interest groups favoring cooperation when they pressure their governments to resume compliance. Public pressure is especially important for implementing environmental agreements (Haas, Keohane, and Levy 1993). % Additional citations: dinar 2011, dai2005, Benvenisti, 1996; Waterbury, 2002 – from one of the river articles

\end{comment}

\subsection{Leadership and Coalition Change}

My theory posits that opposition to an agreement within the winning coalition or selectorate of each state should be lower when states are economically dependent on each other. As a result, leaders should experience less blowback from domestic audiences when they sign border settlements with states with which they have a strong economic relationship. By contrast, leaders who sign settlements with unimportant economic partners are more likely to be removed by their winning coalition in favor of a leader who will abrogate agreements. Likewise, there is a lower probability that domestic opposition to agreements evokes a change in the willing coalition when states are highly dependent on each other. As a result, these states should be less likely to renege on previously signed agreements. This results in the following three hypotheses:

# \*\*\*\*\* LEADER REMOVAL/COALITION CHANGE

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\begin{hypothesis} As the level of economic interdependence between two states increases, the probability that leaders are removed from office after signing territorial agreements decreases. \end{hypothesis}

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# \*\*\*\*\* HYPOTHESES

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